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Abstract
IPCC’s 2018 Special Report is a stark and bracing reminder of climate threats. Yet literature,
reportage, and public discourse reﬂect imbalanced risk and opportunity. Climate science often
understates changes’ speed and nonlinearity, but Integrated AssessmentModels (IAMs) and similar
studies often understate realisticmitigation options. Since∼2010, globalmitigation of fossil
CO2—including by often-uncountedmodern renewable heat comparable to solar-plus-wind
electricity—has accelerated to about the pace (if sustained) needed for a 2 °C trajectory.Mitigation
has uncertainties, emergent properties, feasibility thresholds, and nonlinearities at least comparable
to climate’s, creating opportunities for aggressive action. Renewable electricity’s swift uptake can
now be echoed as proven integrative design canmake end-use efﬁciency severalfold larger and
cheaper, often with increasing returns (lower cost with rising quantity). Saved energy—the world’s
largest decarbonizer and energy ‘source’ (bigger than oil)—can then potentiate renewables and cut
supply investments, as a few recent efﬁciency-centric IAMs conﬁrm.Optimizing choices,
combinations, timing, and sequencing of technologies, urban form, behavioral shifts, etc could save
still more energy,money, and time. Some rigorous engineering-based national studies outside
standard climate literature even imply potential 1.5 °C global trajectories cheaper than business-as-
usual. A complementary opportunity—rapidly and durably abating hydrocarbon industries’
deliberate upstreamCH4 releases from ﬂares and engineered vents, by any large operator’s
proﬁtably abating its own and others’ emissions—could stabilize (ormore) the globalmethane cycle
and buy time to abatemore CO2. Together, these ﬁndings justify sober recalibration of the prospects
for a fairer, healthier, cooler, and safer world. Supported by other disciplines, improved IAMs can
illuminate this potential and support its reﬁnement. Ambitious policies and aggressivemarketplace
and societal adoption of proﬁtable new abatement opportunities need not wait for bettermodels,
but bettermodels would help them to attractmerited attention, scale faster, and turn numbing
despair into collectively powerful applied hope.
‘To be truly radical is to make hope possible, rather
than despair convincing’ (Williams 1989). Though
‘hope is a stance, not an assessment’ (Lappé 2018), a
proper balance between hope and fear—a constructive
balance, since people cannot be depressed into action
—recedes when the public tone is set by statements
like this from a prominent journalist’s special feature
ﬁlling an entire issue of The New York Times Magazine
(Rich 2018):
The odds of succeeding [in holding the
rise in global average temperature
below 2 °C], according to a recent
study based on current emissions
trends, are one in 20K.The climate
scientist James Hansen has called two-
degree warming ‘a prescription for
long-term disaster.’ Long-term dis-
aster is now the best-case scenario.
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Yet that recent study’s 5% odds (Raftery et al 2017)
assume global GDP’s carbon intensity will fall only at
the same average rate (∼1.9% yr−1) to 2030 as it did in
2012–18 (1.91% yr−1 average annual rate of change in
total energy-related CO2 emitted per unit of real global
GDPPPP). But the approximate decomposition
graphed in ﬁgure 1 for 2012–18 to illuminate the
underlying causes of that reduced carbon intensity
totals nearly twice as big, 3.68% yr−1, and its trends are
accelerating. The causal factors underlying the Times
article’s ‘current emissions trends’ are actually from
1960 to 2010 and seem to have ended then.
When the Paris Agreement entered into force in
late 2016, the annual rate of cutting the carbon inten-
sity of the global economy, using the approximate
metrics graphed below, was trending upward through
4.6% yr−1. That’s 2.7 times higher than the 1.7% yr−1
average decline for 1991–2010; 1.3 times the
∼3.4% yr−1 required7 through 2050 for a 2 °C trajec-
tory; and 0.7 times the∼6.7% yr−1 required for 1.5 °C
(Rogelj et al 2018a, SM table 3). It is also within
striking distance of UN Sustainable Development
Goal 7.3’s doubling of the 2015 rate of global energy
efﬁciency gain by 20308. The deﬁnitive direct metric,
fossil-energy carbon per real global GDPPPP dollar, fell
2.64% yr−1 in the favorable years 2014–16—two-
ﬁfths faster than the Times story’s source (Raftery et al
2017) assumed to 2030. Far safer but harder is the
aspirational Paris goal of 1.5 °C averagewarming, con-
sistent with mitigation pathways only sparsely mod-
eled until recently (Rogelj et al 2015, Luderer et al
2016, Bertram et al 2018, Grübler et al 2018, Holz et al
2018, McCollum et al 2018). Yet the stronger mitiga-
tion tools this requires are now emerging.
Of course, the most critical metric is the green-
house gas concentrations caused by emissions, notably
2018’s alarming new record of 37 GTCO2 yr
−1
(Jackson et al 2019). Emissions depend on activity
times intensity. Reducing energy and carbon inten-
sities is our focus here to cut emissions regardless of
GDP’s exogenous and unknowable trajectory (further
complicated by seldom-modeled feedbacks: lowering
energy costs and climate harm could boost GDP or
Figure 1. Suggestive pattern-breaking post-∼2010 behavior (heavy lines) in the rising non-fossil-fuel share of global total ﬁnal energy
consumption (TFEC, aqua) and in the falling primary energy used to produce a dollar of global GDPPPP. Themagenta energy intensity
series is synthesized fromBPprimary energy consumption divided byWorld Bank global GDPPPP to avoid technology-inconsistent
primary-energy accounting conventions in the IEAdataset.,18, 19 IEAprimary energy intensity, graphed for comparison in
supplementalmaterial, part 1 (available online at stacks.iop.org/ERL/14/120201/mmedia), behaves similarly, but its 2009–18
regression shows a steeper trend and better ﬁt (y=–0.0024x+4.77,R2=0.38) than the graphed synthetic intensity series, which is
therefore conservative. Sources: IEA online database (TFEC); BP (2019, using the substitutionmethod18) for renewables (except
renewable heat data from the IEAonline database, conﬁrmed by IEA (2018c), p 258,ﬁgure 6.6, subtracting BP ‘biofuels’ from IEA
‘other renewables’);World Bank onlineWorldDevelopment Indicators (real GDPPPP) accessed July 2019; IPCCAR5 (2 °Cbar);
Rogelj et al (2018a) (1.5 °Cbar). Not smoothed or normalized forweather, business cycles, or other exogenous factors; ‘well below 2˚’
conservatively approximated as 2˚.
7
IPPC’s AR5 2˚ scenarios span a 1.6–2.5%/y average 2010–2100
rate of decreasing primary energy intensity, combined with 1.1–
1.5%/y decreases in carbon intensity. Those ranges’means add, for
rough indicative purposes, to ∼3.4%/y, exceeding the >2.5%/y
sum suggested by the Energy Transitions Commission for ⩽2 C˚
(ETC 2016). IEA (2018) agrees 1.7%/y is ‘half of what is required to
remain on track with the Paris Agreement’. The differencemay trace
back to IEA’s 2011 450 scenario’s 50% probability vs. the higher
odds (e.g. 66%)widely required lately.
8
R Kyte, personal communication, 20 Aug 2018, though Subratty
(2017) seems to suggest, and IEA (2018b pp 13, 29) conﬁrms, that
the target rate is∼2.7–2.8%, not twice IEA’s reported rate of 2.8%/y
for the agreed 2015 base year. Perhaps the discrepancy reﬂects IEA’s
and the World Bank’s dispute about whether to use a multi-year
moving average to even outﬂuctuations like those shown inﬁgure 2.
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raising them reduce it). GDP measures gross eco-
nomic output, not net human welfare or happiness, so
we prefer explicit physical activity metrics, but GDP
remains conventional shorthand for a key emission
driver (Raupach et al 2007). In 2000–10, lower energy/
GDP cut average decadal CO2 emissions by 5 GT yr
−1
while population growth raised them by 3, higher car-
bon intensity by<1, and higher GDP/capita by 6, for a
net total of 6.8 more GTCO2 yr
−1 than in the previous
decade (IPCC 2014, p 9). Standard models assume
average ∼2.3% yr−1 GDP growth in 1990–2100
(Nakićenović et al 2000, p 93). Broadly, our implicit
GDP assumptions align with moderate (SSP-2) trajec-
tories, i.e. GDP growth ∼3.1% yr−1 2010–50, though
with wide divergence 2050–2100 (IPCC 2018). The
encouraging intensity trends we report could help off-
set climate risks of faster GDP growth or reinforce cli-
mate risk reductions from slower GDP growth. As
most political leaders strive to maximize rates of GDP
growth, themain pragmatic tools at hand are powerful
new ways to reduce intensities more and faster than
even recent efﬁciency-and-renewables-centric models
—reinforced, toward the end of our paper, by a novel
accelerant frommethane abatement.
Belatedly, haltingly, yet with gathering focus and
force, humanity is responding to an existential threat.
IPCC’s October 2018 Special Report on Global Warm-
ing of 1.5 °C (IPCC 2018), encouragingly invited in the
adoption of the Paris Agreement, is both a sobering
reminder of that formidable threat and an invigorating
recognition of emergent potential solutions. This arti-
cle seeks to help analysis, reporting, and reﬂection
catch upwith gratifying recent developments, rebalan-
cing the climate conversation in a spirit of neither
optimism nor pessimism but of applied hope (UCB
2011). Neither complacency nor despair is warranted.
We need not panicked short-termism but resolute
commitment, blending incisive impatience with
relentless patience and high ambition.
As insight and worry deepen, more climate scien-
tists (e.g. Brown and Caldeira 2017, Schellnhuber
2018, Steffen et al 2018) are sharing profound
concerns long kept mainly private. Moving at the
cautious pace of science and policymaking (Oreskes
Oppenheimer and Jamieson 2019), with publication
lags compounded by slow diffusion into public and
policy discourse9, climate models conservatively
underestimated the speed and nonlinearity of
emergent climate change (Spratt and Dunlop 2018).
We posit integrated assessments and similar energy/
economic studies based on those climate models also typi-
cally underestimate, at least equally, many large, prac-
tical, and proﬁtable options for mitigating climate
change, especially on the demand side. Offsetting these
contrary biases, the outcome of what Jeremy Gran-
tham calls ‘the race of our lives’ remains very much in
play—if we double down on what works and embrace
often-unexpected opportunities for action.
About 80% of 2017 world commercial ﬁnal energy
use (REN21 2019) and 81% of 2016 world commercial
primary energy supply (IEA 2018a) came from fossil
fuels. Their combustion emits CO2 causing about two-
thirds of radiative forcing (we will return to the rest
later). Multiplying these two terms (4/5×2/3), fossil
fuels’ CO2 causes about half of radiative forcing. Miti-
gating that forcing requires ‘drastic [energy] efﬁciency
improvements’10 (IPCC2014,p140)plus decarbonized
energy supply. Efﬁciency is often informally assumed to
be stagnant, largely completed, thoroughly understood,
and a bit stodgy. Models’ assumed efﬁciency potential
varies but is generally modest. This article suggests the
opposite. Even the International Energy Agency’s Efﬁ-
cient World Scenario (IEA 2018b)—which could peak
energy-related greenhouse gas emissions before 2020
and cut them 12% by 2040 despite doubled GDP, using
only 7% more primary energy in 2040 than 2017,
achieving over 40% of the Paris Agreement’s 2 °C
target with 3:1 ﬁnancial returns from saved energy
alone—may understate modern efﬁciency’s proﬁtable
potential.
Energy efﬁciency presents new rapid-
growth, declining-cost opportunities akin
to renewables
Most analysts now realize that renewable sources of
electricity and energy storage (Kittner et al 2017) are
becoming bigger and cheaper at a phenomenal yet
sustainable pace (Breyer et al 2016, Creutzig et al 2017,
Haegel et al 2017) driven by increasing economic
returns—the more we buy and learn, the cheaper the
technology gets, so we buy and learn more, so it gets
cheaper. Thus positive feedback occurs not only in
climate but also in decarbonizing technology coevol-
ving with policy (Abramczyk et al 2017). In 201711
64% (REN21 2019), and in 2018 68% (FS-UNEP-
BNEF2019p 26)of theworld’s net additions of electric
generating capacity were modern renewables (i.e.
9
Adding further inertia and hysteresis, evidence from a great many
ﬁelds shows that researchers are typically 50%overconﬁdent in their
own results (Shlyakhter et al 1994). Integrated assessment modeling
couldmake a signiﬁcantmethodological advance by recommending
that practitioners recalibrate their models by comparing forecasts
with actual outcomes and then adjusting their conﬁdence intervals
accordingly. Shlyakhter and Kammen (1992) develop a methodol-
ogy for sea-level rise, and in Shlyakhter et al (1994) develop this
metric for energymodels.
10
In the three end-use sectors (mobility, buildings, industry) that
directly burn slightly over half the world’s fossil fuel (IPCC 2014) and
in the power plants, reﬁneries, and other conversion systems that
produce ﬁnal energy for delivery to those sectors (Edelenbosch
2018).
11
FS-UNEP-BNEF (2018), adjusted from that source’s 61% by
correcting the report’s FS-acknowledged error of assuming BNEF’s
Feb 2017 forecast of 11 GW of net nuclear additions in 2017; the
actual was 0.3 GW (IAEA PRIS), or 0.9 GW including US upratings
(USNRC). Whether the 2018 value contains a similar conservatism
is unknown.
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excluding hydroelectric dams of 50MWe). Those
increasingly cost-competitive or cost-superior technol-
ogies quietly passed nuclear power’s electricity output
in 2016 and an astounding one trillion watts’ installed
global capacity in mid-2017. That 1 TW capacity took
about 15 years to build; the next TW will take about
4–5 years (Amin 2018). OneTWofwind and solar power
was installed by mid-2018—65-fold growth since 2000,
over 4-fold since 2010—with the next TW expected by
mid-2023 at 46% lower cost (BNEF 2018a). Thus both
positive feedbacks and uncertainties in climate science
may be mirrored by those in mitigation opportunities
and their projected costs (Weyant 2017, Farmer et al
2019, Lovins 2019). Yet it is hard to ﬁnd Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs) that foretold this renewable
energy story—perhaps largely because conventional
economic models’ structures cannot easily (if at all)
backcast or forecast increasing returns.
The International Energy Agency raised its annual
World Energy Outlook series’ long-term windpower
forecasts by sixfold and its solar photovoltaic (PV)
power forecasts by 23-fold during 2002–18. Yet reality
moved faster: today’s PV capacity exceeds 50 times
IEA’s 2002 forecast, lately adding each year more net
new capacity globally than all fossil-fueled and nuclear
additions combined, and adding 100 GW more than
in the previous year. This growth drove down renew-
able prices, speeding growth: world levelized nominal
prices fell in 2016 alone by 17% for utility-scale PV,
18% for onshore wind, and 28% for offshore wind
(FS-UNEP-BNEF 2017 p 17), while the lowest bids fell
37% for Mexican PV and 43% for EU offshore wind
(Kåberger 2017). Thus IEA’s World Energy Outlook
(2018c) predicted renewables would get 69%–77% of
global electricity-generating investment in 2018–40,
consistent with Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s
New Energy Outlook’s 76% (BNEF 2019). BNEF’s
short-term 1Q18 PV growth forecast rose >50% in a
year, and its 18 June 2019 long-term PV forecast pre-
dicted global installed capacity of 2.4 TW by 2030 and
7.5 TW by 2050—surpassing the world’s present total
generating capacity of 7 TW.
In the ﬁrst half of 2019 (Kåberger and Ziss-
ler 2019), China, India, the US, and Germany gener-
ated 36 TWh less from fossil fuels than in 1H18—the
US and Germany cut fossil generation three times as
much as China and India raised theirs—while the four
nations’ carbon-free generation rose by 139 TWh.
Germany’s windpower outgenerated lignite (and in
June, solar beat both) as renewables neared half total
net generation, up from 10% in 2000. India and China
raised renewable output by more in two years than
their nuclear output in 2018. Might renewables,
reduced intensity plus slowing economic growth yet
shrink global CO2 emissions in 2019?
That’s supply—and now the other shoe in the
energy revolution is dropping. A new synthesis
(Lovins 2018) argues that like renewables, and just as
invisibly to today’s canonical modeling methods, the
energy efﬁciency resource is severalfold larger and cheaper
than had been generally accepted (Graus et al 2009), and
often exhibits increasing returns. That’s less due to
mass production of fast-learning, short-lead-time
technology under innovative business and ﬁnancial
models than to design innovations in choosing tech-
nologies together to work optimally with each other,
not separately so theywork against each other (id).
With such integrative designmethods swiftly evol-
ving, efﬁcient energy end-use is not a thoroughly char-
acterized, slow-changing, dwindling-quantity, rising-
cost resource, but an emergent, rapidly evolving,
expanding-quantity, falling-cost resource. Its cost falls
because optimizing buildings, vehicles and mobility
systems, factories, equipment, etc as whole systems for
multiple beneﬁts, not as isolated parts for single bene-
ﬁts, uses not more and fancier devices but fewer and
simpler devices—more artfully chosen, combined,
sequenced, and timed (id, Elberling et al 1998). This
opportunity is hard to capture with traditional eco-
nomic theory or conventional modeling, which apply
structurally different logic, but emerges clearly from
careful, cutting-edge engineering practice. There is lit-
tle evidence that these recent major advances in design
practice and its empirical results are adequately
accounted for in normative IAMs or othermodels.
These systemic opportunities and nonlinearities are
hard to capture even in engineering-economic basic
frameworks using conventional approaches. For
instance, the widely used ‘McKinsey curves’ (supply
curves of carbon abatement, e.g. Creyts et al 2007, Nau-
clér and Enkvist 2009,McKinsey&Company 2010) con-
sider single measures as independent interventions
whose sequential implementation raises marginal costs.
However, by implementing measures in a bundle,
whole-system optimization reduces overall costs12. The
12
This is trueof energy systems (e.g. Lovins andRMI2011,Goldemberg
2011) andof energy supplies: when solar,wind and energy storage are all
modelednot as a single-variate functionofdeployment,but as a function
of both total deployment and effort, their rates of cost improvement are all
strikingly similar (Kittner et al 2017). Similarly, improvements in solar
cells help spur investment and improvement in energy storage, and vice
versa. Similar but less-recognized synergies apply to energy efﬁciency.
For example,manybuildingmodels establishoptimal levels of insulation
or window U-values as individual interventions. Such methods will
reveal that triple-pane windows or heat-recovery ventilation make no
economic sense. However, when a whole passive house is costed,
including triple-pane or better windows (the senior author’s passive
home uses superwindows that insulate like 16–22 panes) and heat-
recovery ventilation, these exceed the costs of conventional designs by
small margins, if at all, for several reasons. First, once a leaky building is
air-tightened, the marginal beneﬁts of going from better-than-double-
pane windows, or to heat-recovery ventilation, are more attractive.
Furthermore, such engineering approaches bring downheat demand so
much that heating systems can shrink substantially, offsetting these
efﬁciency measures’ extra cost (NAS 2009 p 40: ‘The net incremental
ﬁrst cost of achieving a 50 percent reduction in energy use through an
integrated approach can be at or near zero; the savings fromdownsizing
and simplifying HVAC systems generally pay fully for the additional
costs of measures such as additional insulation, better windows, and
daylighting….’). Very high- performance commercial buildings can
even decrease capital costs per m2, due to the value of rentable space,
plenum height, ﬂoor-to-ﬂoor height, and structure saved by shrinking
HVACrooms,pipes, andducts andbymassdecompounding.
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vast majority of climate and energy models, both bot-
tom-up and top-down, are unable or at least challenged
to capture systemic optimization even at an engineering
level, let alone in the wider interplay of (radical) technol-
ogywith societal changes (Geels et al2017).
The IAMs that do emphasize energy efﬁciency—not
the dominant practice, as elaborated below—nearly
always assume point-value cost and performance for a
limited set of speciﬁc technologies. These are sometimes
augmentedby innovations inusage, such as urbandesign
that needs less driving (Güneralp et al 2017) or social-sci-
encemethods that encouragemindful use (Creutzig et al
2016, 2018, Mundaca et al 2019)13. But such analyses
aren’t only at risk of being outrun by stunning innova-
tion—e.g. LEDs,which in eachdecade got 30 timesmore
efﬁcient, 20 times brighter, and 10 times cheaper
(Narukawa 2010), so they’re set to save an eighth of
the world’s electricity (versus ∼2005, estimated from
DeAlameida et al 2014). They alsomissmajor categories
so simple they’re rarely acknowledged (see box).
An example of overlooked efﬁciency opportunities.
Using fat, short, straight pipes and ducts—not skinny,
long, crooked ones—can cut their ﬂuid-handling fric-
tion by ∼80–90+% (Stasinopoulos et al 2009,
Lovins 2018). Since at least half the world’s electricity
powers motors, half to run pumps and fans (with
pumping energy combattingmainly friction not grav-
ity), this single opportunity—typically paying back in
less than a year for retroﬁts, instantly for newbuilds—
could in principle, if fully exploited worldwide, save
about one-ﬁfth of the world’s electricity (id), equiva-
lent to about half of all coal-ﬁred electricity. Yet it’s not
in any national study, industry forecast, IAM, or
(except Stasinopoulos et al 2009) engineering text,
because it’s not a technology; it is adesignmethod. Few
people thinkof design as a scaling vector.Mostmodels
can accommodate improvements only by single tech-
nologies or price signals, and IAMs are not granular
enough todetect this∼4GTCO2 yr−1missing term.
The compelling new evidence of far larger and
cheaper efﬁciency opportunities spans all sectors
(Wilson et al 2012, Lovins 2018)—not only the
buildings sector (Ürge-Vorsatz et al 2012, 2013,
2015) as IPCC analyzes (Lucon Ürge-Vorsatz et al
2014). That is great news for climate, because
reduced energy intensity—now the world’s largest
energy ‘source,’ bigger than oil14—invisibly deliv-
ered three-fourths of the 2010–16 marginal
decarbonization of global GDP (IEA 2017 p 19), and
more than renewables plus nuclear power even in
2017–18 when energy savings were the slowest in this
decade (IEA 2019 p. 8). The same is true in the Uni-
ted States, where intensity reduction since 1975 has
enabled 30 times more new energy services than
doubled renewable output has done. Yet the ratio of
headlines and attention is roughly the opposite,
because renewables can be conspicuous while energy
is invisible and unused energy is nearly unimagin-
able. As discussed below, nearly all of the all-sector
IAMs (with a prominent exception noted below,
Grübler et al 2018) now lag reality at least as much
for potential energy efﬁciency gains as for renewable
energy supplies, and oftenmore so. Underestimating
both these critical climate mitigations shrinks the
solution space, cramps policy responses, and may
result in buying costlier and risker options than we
actually need, slowing mitigation and locking in
more climate risk.
To be sure, global scale-up of energy efﬁciency, tradi-
tional or radical, faces many major and richly docu-
mented obstacles (NAS 2009, Boutons et al 2010). The
integrative design methods needed to realize its increas-
ing returns require not just physical but mental retroﬁts
—‘re-minding’ designers, rewriting textbooks, revising
curricula, and changing deeply embedded assumptions,
habits, and metaphors. (E.g. the common metaphor of
‘low-hanging fruit,’ implying that larger savings will cost
more, is really about eye-level fruit: the best practitioners
look lower and see fallen-down fruitmushing up around
their ankles and spilling in over the tops of their waders,
and also higher, revealing fruit profusely growing back
faster than they can harvest it. They typically also use a
wide variety of tools to harvest all the fruit at once from a
given tree, more cheaply than returning repeatedly to
harvest it piecemeal.)
Fortunately, with many trillions of dollars’ worth of
net-present-valued (NPV) savings on the table, institu-
tional and psychological barriers are starting to
morph into business and policy opportunities. Recogniz-
ing far bigger but cheaper savings is the ﬁrst step in cap-
turing them. Energy and climate modeling must lead by
fundamentally modernizing its methods and assump-
tions. Otherwise, its ﬁndings will increasingly diverge
from the real opportunity space andwill divert policy and
investor attention away from these demand-side oppor-
tunities to socially and environmentally more con-
troversial ones—less likely to succeed competitively and
logistically—by continuing to emphasize supply-side and
(unproven)CO2-removal options, especially inovershoot
and energy-intensive scenarios (e.g. Clarke et al 2014,
Fuss et al 2014, Kriegler et al 2017). IAMs uniquely link
‘mitigation strategies and technology portfolios to cumu-
lative emissions budgets and, consequently, warming
outcomes,’ so they ‘have become “gatekeepers of
research” in the domain’ (Mundaca et al 2019, p 344).
Therefore, they must correctly describe the most impor-
tantmitigations.
13
The literature on behavioral economics and environmental
psychology as applied to sustainable energy use is also revealing
multiple interventions that highlight the importance of design (e.g.
on the provision of information, choice settings) that complement
technical measures (e.g. Abrahamse et al 2005, Allcott and Mullai-
nathan 2010, Andor and Fels 2018, Pichert and Katsikopoulos
2008).
14
E.g. 1990–2016 reductions in global energy intensity saved more
energy in 2016 than oil supplied in 2016.
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Pre-2010 trends no longer constrain the
present or future
Stern (2007) and Barker et al (2006), reviewing classical
IAMs, found they did not actually analyze technological
energy efﬁciency; nearly all used economic surrogates, a
method Edelenbosch (2017) called ‘stylized.’ They
assumed historic average rates of improving global
aggregate energy intensity (orwithin about 0.5 percentage
point of them—Rosen and Guenther 2015)—typically
∼1.2% yr−1 in ﬁnal energy during 1971–2010 (IPCC
2014, Fricko et al 2017). Those four decades, often called
‘recent,’ span transformation from an era when many
experts seemed to reject any possibility of signiﬁcant
savings in supposedly-already-optimized market econo-
mies—modern energy efﬁciency began emerging only in
the 1980s—to this decade’s >2% yr−1 progress. Yet a
1.5%–2% yr−1 goal, which some might think ambitious,
falls short of 7 out of 8 years’ experience during 2011–18
(IEAdata,ﬁgure 2), just as the supply-side goalposts are in
rapidmotion too.Where are theyheaded?
The many models that still extrapolate energy-
intensity trends from the decades up to 2010 are miss-
ing this decade’s seemingly pattern-breaking shift
(ﬁgure 1), with early signals starting to emerge sugges-
tively from noise. With the best ﬁt starting in 200915,
global energy intensity broke out of a holding pattern
into decline, just as modern renewables began grow-
ing even faster. Figure 1’s 2011–18 average rate of
primary intensity decline, ∼2.02% yr−1, is two-
thirds of IEA’s (2018) ∼3.2% yr−1 Paris Agreement
target for 2 °C. In 2014–16, intensity reduction plus
decarbonizing supply entirely offset global GDP
growth’s increase in CO2 emissions, before the
intensity drop retreated modestly in 2017 (IEA 2018,
2018b) after low oil prices, and further in 2018
(IEA 2019a, see supplemental data 1). If the world
after 2010 sustained its 2011–18 rather than its
1971–2010 rate of primary energy intensity reduc-
tion, i.e. the yellow not the red line in ﬁgure 2, 2050
primary energy use would be two-ﬁfths lower and
2100 use two-thirds lower—immense if not decisive
progress16. And within such global averages,
Figure 2.The International Energy Agency (IEA 2017, 2018, 2018b, 2019, all averaging annual rates of change without
compounding) reports that global energy intensity (primary energy consumption per dollar of real GDPPPP) fell nearly a
percentage point per year faster during 2011–18 than in the previous three decades. The black text inserts above the three bars on
the right show high sensitivity to Chinese andUS ﬂuctuations, detailed for 2011–17 in IEA (2018b), p 20, and for 2017–18 in the
November 2019 edition (which, as this paper was in press, immaterially dropped the 2018 intensity reduction from the 1.3%
shown to 1.2%, as China changed to−2.8%, EU to−2%, andUS to+0.8%—3× the 0.26% rise shown for 2018 byUSEIA and
Federal Reserve October 2019 data). Prices no doubt inﬂuenced intensities, but econometric analysis seems unneeded here, and
may add little insight: real global prices for diesel and gasoline ﬂuctuatedmodestly in 2005–18 but ended the period virtually
unchanged (IEA 2019b), while in the US, wholesale natural-gas real prices were volatile but fell∼3×, andUS retail real electricity
prices ended ﬂat, now approximatingmid-1970s levels.
15
The global ﬁnancial crisis was found to be an important driver
triggering—at least initially—lower energy intensity. From a
regional point of view, however, different trends were revealed
compared to historical trends (Mundaca et al 2013, Mundaca &
Markandya 2016).
16
From 2010 to 2050 (2100), the difference between an average
1% and a 2% or 4% annual drop in energy intensity is respectively
a 33% (59%) or 69% (97%) drop in long-term energy use. The
2.5%/y 2010–50 rate of the SSP1 storyline (van Vuuren et al 2017)
matches the 2.5%/y maximum in IPPC’s AR5 2C˚-scenario
database; the EMF27 results of nine IAMs suggest a 2 C˚ policy
could achieve global averages of 1.3–2.9%/y with a 2.3%/y
median (Sugiyama et al 2014). AR5’s fastest average projected
2010–50 primary energy intensity reductions (IPCC 2014, p 426)
are ∼2.5%/y for OECD and ∼3.7%/y for non-OECD, though
EMF models often constrain projected purchases of proﬁtable
new technologies to ﬁt ‘people’s actual behavior’ (Rosen and
Guenther 2015) under conditions that no longer exist and that
entrepreneurs and activists aim to change as much as possible, so
assuming those conditions is akin to driving while looking in the
rear-viewmirror.
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examples abound of much faster savings already
achieved in many places17 by widely adaptable and
adoptablemeans.
Strikingly, ﬁgure 1 shows that averaged over the
past three years (2015–18e), the combined effect of pri-
mary energy intensity reduction plus increased share
of decarbonized ﬁnal supply18 totaled 3.4% yr−1—the
same rate, if sustained, that IPCCAR5 found necessary
for a 2 °C trajectory, and trending toward (though still
well short of) the sustained ∼6.7% yr−1 needed to
2050 for 1.5 °C (Rogelj et al 2018a, SSP1). Though
trend is not destiny, the future is largely choice not
fate, so despair is indeed as unwarranted as
complacency.
To test ﬁgure 1, we must probe the data for
underlying causalities. Recent shifts in annual
rates of change reﬂect ﬂuctuating denominators
(energy use and GDPPPP)—especially labile during
this decade’s economic ﬂuctuations and volatile
weather. A skeptic might argue that diverse tren-
dlines and even ambiguous slopes might be
claimed for almost any short portion of such ‘noisy’
graphs. However, enough signal has lately emerged
to show that the new trends graphed as heavy lines
at the right side of ﬁgure 1 appear to reﬂect
fundamentally new causes, not random ﬂuctuations.
Here’s why.
Figure 2 shows how primary19 energy intensity has
fallen nearly one percentage point per year faster since
around 2010 (best ﬁt from 2009) than during the pre-
vious three decades.
This decade’s faster intensity reduction reﬂects
better technologies and designs, improved opera-
tions, and structural shifts, plus progress in mitigat-
ing numerous market failures and behavioral
anomalies in buying energy efﬁciency, hence advan-
ces in exploiting business opportunities to correct
them. Smarter public policies (Lovins and RMI 2011,
Harvey 2019) are all synergistically raising the bar—
ambitious building codes towards nearly zero-
energy buildings, stringent minimum performance
standards (including updating like Japan’s market-
led Top Runner programs), education and training,
market-making, barrier-busting, desubsidization
of fossil fuels, internalization of climate and other
public costs, alignment of split incentives, PACE
bonds, performance-based design fees, decoupling
and shared savings for utilities, feebates for auto-
buyers,K, plus ﬁnancing, market delivery, tech-
nology, and customer attention. Yet integrative
design, not yet widely practiced or noticed, creates a
huge new overhang of unbought and unsuspected
efﬁciency that entrepreneurs and organizations like
Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) aim to shift from
rare to routine.
On the supply side, ﬁgures 3(a), (b) validate
ﬁgure 1’s trend break (best ﬁt from 2010), while also
showing the need for more beneﬁcial electriﬁcation
of uses now fossil-fueled. Figure 3b’s colorful
forest of post-2010 renewable growth is new and
large. The big surprise is the orange wedge at the
top of ﬁgure 3(a), modern renewable heat: though
seldom noted or analyzed, it supplied 4.2 percent
of TFEC in 2017—3% more than solar electricity
plus wind electricity, though they pulled 10% ahead
in 2018. This large non-electric term does not appear
to be included in the widely used BP database,
whose ‘geothermal, biomass, and wastes’ and
‘solar’ terms match other databases’ electricity-only
outputs.
Since electricity was only 20% of 2015 global
ﬁnal energy, even very rapid growth in renewable
electricity is strongly diluted by transport (32%)
and heat (48%). Some important end-uses, such as
low-temperature heat and light/medium mobility,
should be largely saved, then efﬁciently electriﬁed.
But for some end-uses, renewably-derived heat
or fuels may prove better and cheaper, so the
fashionable goal of ‘electrify everything’ is a some-
what exaggerated oversimpliﬁcation. It’s therefore
encouraging that ∼16 EJ yr−1 of previously little-
noticed modern renewable heat is already being
delivered.
Nearly all IAMs’ understatement of energy efﬁ-
ciency is due not only to outdated trend data and lim-
ited technical granularity of the demand side but also
to imbalanced analytic methods and structures and to
some questionable assumptions, such as all potential
17
Actual average annual energy-intensity reductions include
China’s 7.0% 1991–5 and 4.8% 2012–16, Japan’s 3.4% 1975–81 and
3.5% 2011–16, Tokyo’s 5.4% 2002–12, Denmark’s 6.9% 1997–2000
and 4.6% 2011–16, Ireland’s 4.8%/y 2007–16, and California’s
3.2% 1998–2005 and 2.8% 2010–15. Some exceptional medium-
sized and large companies, too, have sustained 6–16% over periods
of years.
18
This is a conservative, intuitively straightforward, easily
explained approximation for decarbonizing the global economy.
J G Koomey (personal communication, 26 Oct 2018) correctly
notes that our choice of metrics in Figure 1 may somewhat
understate the total reduction in fossil CO2 emissions per dollar
of global GDP, because it counts substitution of carbon-free
sources for fossil-fueled ones, and resulting avoidance of
thermal-power-plant conversion losses, but omits substitution of
less- for more-carbon-intensive fuels. That effect could also be
captured by combining ﬁnal energy intensity of global GDP with
two terms in Koomey et al (2018)’s extended Kaya decomposi-
tion, i.e. reduction in Total Fossil Carbon per unit of Total
Primary Energy (Direct-Equivalence Method). The results are
then roughly comparable to Figure 1, although until 2013–16,
when its R2 exceeds 0.6 (n = 4), its ﬁt is not as good as ﬁgure 1
shows.
19
IEA’s primary energy counts nuclear but not solar and wind
electricity at triple value—the amount of fossil fuel that a
traditional thermal power plant would have burned to produce it
(the Substitution method: Koomey et al 2018). BP primary energy
data in mtoe (not TWh) use a triple-value convention for all
primary electricity. Figures 3(a), (b) avoid this issue—and confu-
sion between primary energy saved by efﬁcient use or structural
change with savings from switching to non-combustion sources
—by using IEA ﬁnal energy (hence the Direct Equivalence
method, id).
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cost-effective efﬁciency’s being achieved in baselines.
Supplemental material, part 2, critiques these deﬁ-
ciencies—and offers encouraging news about recent
improvements, which we amplify next. State-of-the-
art IAM scenarios conﬁrm that falling energy intensity
is not only vital for meeting stringent mitigation goals
(Clarke et al 2014, Riahi et al 2015, Rogelj et al 2015,
Kriegler et al 2018); it is the most important variable,
more important than economic growth, and is the
main cause of SSP1–SSP5 scenarios’ widely divergent
long-term energy demands. Improving the previously
sparse modeling of energy efﬁciency’s potential is
therefore revealing remarkable new mitigation
opportunities.
Figure 3.The 1975–2018 growth of global Total Final Energy Consumption (TFEC) fromnon-fossil-fuel sources of electricity, heat,
and fuels (panel a) accelerated sharply from∼2010 as new technologies supplemented stagnant old ones, sprouting a new forest at the
right side of panel b. All data areﬁnal except 2018modern renewable heat, estimated from2017 using its average 2014–17 3 years’
growth rate, and 2018TFEC,which is preliminary. Energy consumption here and throughout this article excludes nonfuel uses.
Primary electricity is converted at 3.6MJ kWh−1 using theDirect Equivalencemethod, rather than at 4.4 TWh/Mtoe using the
Substitutionmethod.18 Sources: BP (2019) for all resources, except renewable heat (which excludes traditional biomass—7%of 2017
TFEC) from IEAonline database, veriﬁedwithin∼1% from IEA (2018c), p 258, ﬁgure 6.6, by subtracting BP ‘biofuels’ from IEA ‘other
renewables’, and conﬁrmed directly with IEA Statistics. (BPdoes not appear to show renewable heat, while IEA aggregates biofuels
with biomass. BP’s biofuels data begin in 1990.)REN21 (2019) draws very similar renewable heat data from IEA and reports it totals
4.2%of 2017TFEC, comprising approximately 89%biomass, 9% solar, and 2%geothermal. Year-to-year ﬂuctuations reﬂect irregular
hydropower additions and hydrology; wind and solar output growth are steadier. Nuclear additions—stressed by uncompetitive
operating costs, lack of a newbuild business case, and operational problems—struggle to outpace retirements (Schneider
et al 2018, 2019). Nuclear decline probably beneﬁts climate due to such costly-to-build-or-run resources’ opportunity cost (Lovins
and Palazzi 2019, Lovins 2019c).
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Initial IAMefﬁciencymodeling is proving
its gamechanging value
Recently some IAMs using highly diverse and
simpliﬁed methods20 have begun explicitly repre-
senting speciﬁc end-uses, chieﬂy light-duty vehicles
(Edelenbosch et al 2017a), steel and cement produc-
tion (Edelenbosch et al 2017), space-heating, and
home appliances, and taking aggregated account of
their canonical efﬁciency potentials. Some results
are dramatic, such as 3–4-fold faster non-OECD
industrial intensity reduction with global industrial
intensity declining as much as 2.1%–3% yr−1
(Edelenbosch et al 2017), and in one case, complete
decarbonization of passenger transport—all ‘clear
break[s] with historical trends’ (Edelenbosch et al
2017a). The SSP1 model puts forward important
aspects of energy savings, yet as argued above, more
granular and speciﬁc energy efﬁciency measures can
reveal more powerful technology portfolios ripe for
better design (van Vuuren et al 2017). Using such
complementary modeling tools as decomposition
analysis, national-level assessments under stringent
emissions targets reveal important energy and car-
bon savings that are not fully captured in global
IAMs (Wachsmuth andDuscha 2018).
More broadly, explicitly modeling just some
end-use efﬁciency options generally ﬁnds severalfold
bigger (Edelenbosch 2018, p 131) and considerably
cheaper energy savings and carbon abatements,
increasing modelers’ motivation to enrich end-use
detail and to make what they call ‘energy system
models’ focus at least as much on demand as on
supply21. But can grafting small engineering-based sub-
models of the easiest-to-model subset of end-uses onto
complex macroeconomic simulations reveal much of
efﬁciency’s promise?And is the obstacle to proper energy
efﬁciency modeling (Creutzig et al 2018) really inherent
complexity, or is it remediable unfamiliarity and inatten-
tion? Is it unavoidablymuch harder tomodel energy efﬁ-
ciency as dynamic, complex, nonlinear, and multi-
layered (cutting across behavioral, economic, environ-
mental, organizational, institutional, and technological
layers, among others) than to do the same on the supply
side, where data are richer and easily available, andwhere
IAMs traditionally and understandably focused most of
their effort? Encouraging evidence is starting tounfold.
After two global IAM studies found that faster and
stronger demand-side measures could achieve 1.5 °C tra-
jectories (Rogelj et al 2015, Luderer et al 2016; IPCC 2018
lists other literature at p 2–23), important new evidence of
a demand-side bonanza emerged from Grübler et al
(2018). Their impressive Low Energy Demand scenario
within the Detailed Process IAM framework combines a
bottom-up activity and demand assessment for four end-
use services, with emphasis on urban form, noneconomic
behavior-science insights, and other non-technological
opportunities—creatively expressed through a set of sty-
lized assumptions synthesized without the IAM frame-
work before utilization within it. This combination
achieves 2050 ﬁnal energy demand 44% below SSP1, the
most sustainable SSP pathway narrative scenario. Supply-
side investments fall by approximately 2–3-fold—saving
from one to several trillion dollars per year by 2050 (with-
out netting out the cost of the savings, no doubt lower but
not yet evaluated)—and even if long-run demand rises
50% above the predicted level, this scenario remains con-
sistentwith a 1.5 °Cgoal. It strongly advances the Sustain-
able Development Goals, and needs no carbon removal
beyondnatural systems.
Yet this scenario’s astonishingly low demand (245
EJﬁnal in 2050)—the lowest yet in any IAM 1.5 °C sce-
nario, and featured in IPCC’s 1.5 °C Special Report
(2018)—is technically conservative. It could be sub-
stantially lower if it included more-aggressive but proven
and cost-effective technologies than, say, 3 L/100 km
autos in 2050—e.g. the carbon-ﬁber-body, battery-elec-
tric, 1.7 Lequiv/100 km (German test cycle) 4-seat car
proﬁtably produced in midvolume since 2013, or a 0.9
Lequiv/100 km 2013 2-seater from another major auto-
maker. Nor does the 2050 opportunity allow any sig-
niﬁcant intensity drop in airplanes (3–5× improvement
looks attractive and feasible (Lovins andRMI2011)with a
customer-led leapfrog—Lovins 2019a), more than 3× in
heavy trucks (Lovins and RMI 2011), etc (as inmost IAM
20
Some IAMs drive technology change by learning curves, most by
price (typically inﬂuenced by policy); IPCC notes (IPCC 2014 at
426) that efﬁciency to a ‘signiﬁcant extent’ is ‘driven by other factors
such as technological progress and changing preferences with rising
incomes, and Sugiyama et al (2014) at ﬁgure S15 ﬁnd huge scatter in
implicit carbon-price elasticities of energy intensity.Most integrated
models are able to project structural and technological change only
at an aggregate level, although some include explicit assumptions for
certain sectors...’. Many models’ workings are opaquely described.
Their structures and emphases vary widely; even data for the same
base years may not match. Partial equilibrium models can incorpo-
rate some technology-speciﬁc choices while weakening its macro-
economic context, while most computable general equilibrium
models derive energy intensity only from technology-blind substitu-
tions between capital, material, labor, and energy inputs. Some
modern models, increasingly, are hybrids of convergent bottom-up
and top-down approaches (Sugiyama et al 2014). Broadly, most
models today are much better than those reviewed by Barker et al
(2006), whose net-cost differences he tried to analyze by regressions
based almost entirely on model structure without directly compar-
ing assumed gross technology costs (Rosen and Guenther 2015).
However, in e.g. the inﬂuential SSP narrative scenarios (Fricko et al
2017), technology cost evolves only on the supply side, and efﬁcient
use is ‘not explicitly modeled,’ so although it’s a ‘key enabling
driver,’ projected improvements ‘remain vastly different’ (>3-fold
by 2100). More general concerns with IAMs are summarized by
Ackerman et al (2009), DeCanio (2003), Scher and Koomey (2011),
Koomey (2013), Pindyck (2017), and Rosen and Guenther (2015).
Several of these authors and Stern (2016) decry widespread lack of
representation of innovation processes across the economy, institu-
tions, and human behavior. Koomey et al (2018) also make
important suggestions to improve IAMs’ outdated metrics and
reporting formats.
21
But not always. Despite its title’s reference to ‘energy system
change,’ van Sluisveld et al (2015) is entirely about supply: ‘Demand-
side investments are not taken into account as such estimates are
subject to considerable uncertainty due to a lack of reliable statistics
and deﬁnitional issues.’ Yet they’re more important to climate
outcomes than are supply investments.
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literature: e.g. Kriegler et al (2018) seem to assume no
gains in any vehicles’ efﬁciency other than from elec-
triﬁcation). Even Grübler et al’s (2018) pioneering study
appears to adopt integrative design only in buildings, not
also in vehicles or industry (Lovins 2018), and its solar-
power assumptions seem conservative.22 So while these
low-demand studies emphatically underline the impor-
tance of high-quality energy services in the 1.5 °C scien-
tiﬁc and policy debate, they also show opportunities for
signiﬁcant further evolution in explicit demand-side
technology analysis and in integrativedesign.
Table 1 (supplemental materials, part 3) usefully
complements IPCC (2018) by comparing demand-side
data for Grübler et al (2018)with other mitigation path-
ways that can also limit global warming to 1.5 °C but
that entail higher demand and/or overshoot emphasiz-
ing active carbon removal. The exciting contrast emer-
gent in table 1 is a starting-point for deeper exploration
of more effective ways to meet growing energy service
demandbyusing less energymore productively.
Another promising line of inquiry (Wilson et al 2018)
observes that ‘IAMs are neither designed to explore nor
are useful for exploring the emergence of novelty in
energy end-use.’ That provocative paper illustrates a new
framework called Disruptive Low-Carbon Innovation by
99 speciﬁc examples that ‘combine business models and
technologies to create appealing value propositions for
consumers’ and ‘engage consumers in efforts to reduce
emissions,’ thereby both ‘displacing carbon-intensive
goods and services’ and ‘dislodging incumbent ﬁrms.’
Integrativedesign shares similar attributes andoutcomes.
Table 1, IPCC (2018), Wilson et al (2018), and the
integrative-design discussion above powerfully expand
the conversation on demand-centric solutions. The next
frontier will be for an ambitious team to leapfrog over
obsolescent, incremental efﬁciency supply curves23 and
consider best practices from and beyond efﬁciency’s
engineering literature.Whatmight this reveal?
Findings of some overlooked national
analyses
A tantalizing hint comes (Lovins 2018) from two book-
length, independent, undisputed studies from respected
institutions, each at a >30-analyst-year level of effort,
both reported in peer-reviewed energy literature24 but
not yet noticed in the climate literature:
• A heavily documented and reviewed 2010–11 US
study (Lovins and RMI 2011) by 61 RMI analysts
showed how tripled energy productivity and
quintupled renewables by 2050 could raise carbon
productivity by 14–18-fold, save $5 trillion in
NPV private internal cost (i.e. valuing carbon and
all other externalities at zero, a conservatively
low number), need no new inventions or national
laws, and be led by business for proﬁt. Its
projections closely match actual 2011–18 GDP
and primary and electric intensity, and understate
renewable trends.
• A 2013–16 Chinese study (ERI 2017) led by the
National Development and Reform Commission’s
noted Energy Research Institute in collaboration
with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, RMI,
and Energy Foundation China showed with strong
empirical grounding—and modeling widely con-
sidered the most thorough, rigorous, and econom-
ically explicit yet done for China—how a 7-fold
increase in energy productivity and a 13-fold
increase in carbon productivity by 2050 could save
$3 trillion in NPV private internal cost. These
ﬁndings strongly informed the 13th Five Year Plan
nowbeing executed.
If these exceptionally detailed ﬁndings for the top
two global carbon-emitting nations, plus analogous
EU ones, were simply extrapolated (scaled by GDP) to
the other half of the world, they would imply that a
2 °C trajectory could cut the NPV cost of energy ser-
vices by ∼$18 trillion (ignoring all externalities). This
crude thought-experiment (Lovins 2018) suggests that
partial reinvestment in natural-systems carbon
removal could probably achieve a ∼1.5 °C trajectory,
still with trillions of dollars left over.
Obviously such startling results merit detailed
scrutiny and modeling. But these ambitious syntheses
may prove conservative because they make only lim-
ited use of integrative design and of today’s insights
into urban form, human behavior, and further factors
exploited by Grübler et al (2018) and in other
advanced IAM literature cited above. Initial studies
22
Grübler et al (2018)’s projection of solar PV adoption in 2020–30 is
the industry’s actual growth in the previous decade;Haegel et al (2017)
show how global PV installed capacity could reach at least 3 TW by
2030 (15%/y CAGR) or 10 TW (29%/y); Grübler et al (2018) justify
their 16%/y by their scenario’s low demand. But their needed PV
growth rate is actually lower anyhow, because their apparent 2020
base-year PV installed-capacity assumption from SSP2-1.9 is less
(257 GW) than the actual 398 GW (BNEF says 418 GW) at the end of
2017, or roughly half of BNEF’s actual 525GWat the endof 2018.
23
A note of caution: in principle, supply curves of the energy efﬁciency
resource could greatly improve IAMs, but increasingly the supply-curve
methodology too seems inadequate and outmoded. Technology-by-
technology supply curves elucidate individual, incremental, isolated,
small, easily analyzed subsets of the efﬁciency resource. They fail to
capture systemic, holistic, integrative opportunities, and thus understate
the efﬁciency resource. For example, traditional supply-curve analysis of
buildings’ energy efﬁciency considers incremental improvements in such
components as insulation, glazings, air-tightening, and furnace and air-
conditioner efﬁciency. But it doesn’t capture thewhole-building, passive-
designoptimizations that, asAR5WGIIIChapter 9’sﬁelddata show, can
keep the cost of artfully designed buildings’ efﬁciency essentially ﬂat for
energy savings up to at least∼90%. Similarly in light-duty vehicles, both
virtual designs and actual market offerings show that whole-vehicle
integrativedesigncanyield severalfold larger efﬁciency, at lower cost, than
found by canonical measure-by-measure supply-curve analyses (Lovins
2018,2018a, 2019b). Suggestivepractical examples showthe same inboth
heavy andhigh-tech industrial energyuse (Lovins2018).
24
Lovins 2015, 2015a; Price et al 2017, Zhou et al 2016, and (a
leadingChinese policy journal)Lovins et al 2016.
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have already revealed (Mundaca et al 2019) ‘an abun-
dance of demand-side measures to limit warming to
1.5 °CKnot allK“seen” or capturedKand some
insufﬁciently represented in the current policy dis-
courseK, [so] demand-side mitigation in line with the
1.5 °C goal is possible’ (though ‘enormously challen-
ging’) andmerits prompt investigation.
Innovative interventions
These opportunities transcend design and technology,
and span many disciplines. The complexity of repre-
senting behavioral and lifestyle changes in IAMs
(Schwanitz 2013, Mundaca et al 2019) retards under-
standing of policy-driven energy demand transforma-
tions—especially for policies not capturable via
economic-engineering modeling (Mundaca Neij
Worrell and McNeil 2010, Geels Berkhout and van
Vuuren 2016). Comprehensive policy suites that
complement traditional policy instruments and
emphasize competitive and contagious diffusion of
demand and skills can stimulate such successes as
passive-building growth just in 2015–18, among
Vancouver BC’s <700 000 residents, from one to
>2200 residential units and ﬁve other buildings,
totaling 232 000 m2, plus 2000 more units in the 2019
approvals pipeline.
Complementary non-price interventions are
also gaining credence. For example, feedback on
energy use boosts savings up to e.g. 15% (Karlin Zin-
ger and Ford 2015), depending on feedback context
and design (Abrahamse Steg Vlek and Rothengat-
ter 2005). Using social norms to trigger comparison
and competition helps too (Allcott and Mullai-
nathan 2010), with due attention to potential side-
effects (Andor and Fels 2018). Commitment devices,
e.g. written pledges, and realistically self-imposed
goals (Harding and Hsiaw 2014) also work, subject
to methodological cautions (Andor and Fels 2018).
At the risk of oversimplifying, policy assessments
highlight that climate policies are likely to be more
cost- and climate-effective when grounded in cogni-
tive, motivational, and contextual factors that affect
technology choice and use (de Coninck et al 2018).
Welfare effects, long-term persistence of outcomes,
causal mechanisms (e.g. psychological determi-
nants), context-speciﬁc conditions, and how infor-
mation is presented to heterogeneous energy users
merit more attention. IAMs therefore should be
complemented by evaluating decarbonization poli-
cies beyond economic incentives and technology
criteria (Geels et al 2016, Mundaca et al 2019), espe-
cially outside the comfortable scope of utility-driven
programs and experiments in developed countries
(Hahn andMetcalfe 2016,Mundaca et al 2019).
Energy shrinkage—or rebound?
Efﬁcient use and decarbonized supply are synergistic.
Making clean energy supply replace, not just augment,
fossil fuels needs efﬁcient use to reduce demand so
dirty, obsolete supplies exit the market. Thus in
1977–85, US GDP grew 27% while oil use fell 17%;
today, speeding US coal retirements opens market
space where renewables can compete (if not pre-
empted by competition-free nuclear walled-garden
zones (Lovins 2019c)). US electricity demand stopped
growing a decade ago (Koomey 2019), about a decade
later than primary energy (Lovins 2018c), but still-
unbought efﬁciency costing one-tenth the average
price of retail electricity could quadruple 2010 electric
efﬁciency (Lovins and RMI 2011, p 204). For estab-
lished reasons (Lovins 2018), savings so far typically
only offset GDP growth, as in California, but coherent
policy can tip electricity demand into shrinkage, as in
Vermont. In 2000–17, 18 IEA member nations’
electricity demand actually shrank, and averaging all
30 nations, its growth fell by four-ﬁfths, from 1.6 to
0.3% yr−1 (IEA 2018c, p 28), all with nearly no
integrative design.
Criticizing such counterfactuals based on unchan-
ged intensities, some economic theorists claim that
potential rebound effects (popularized by Owen 2010,
cf Lovins 2011) will substantially reduce if not even
reverse energy savings. In the complex literature of this
evolving ﬁeld, we give more weight to contrary evi-
dence. Where observable, rebound is generally small
(Greening et al 2000, Geller and Attali 2005, Sor-
rell 2007, Sorrell Dimitropoulos and Sommerville
2009, Goldstein et al 2011, Gillingham et al 2013, Gil-
lingham et al 2015). Where included in major energy
analyses, rebound’s effects on energy demand proved
immaterial (e.g. Lovins and RMI 2011). Early claims of
>100% rebound or ‘backﬁre’ (efﬁciency’s raising
energy demand), based mainly on Saunders (2015),
were severely criticized (e.g. Cullenward and
Koomey 2015, 2016, 2016a, 2016b) but unpersuasively
defended (Saunders 2017); credible observations
of backﬁre, if any, are very rare, and backﬁre is theore-
tically dubious, empirically unprovable, and probably
artifactual (Gillingham et al 2015). Grübler et al (2018)
p 522 note examples of demand saturations that
should blunt rebound; three decades’ residential data
(Lucon et al 2014) likewise seem inconsistent with
substantial rebound. Rebound is in principle manage-
able by policy (e.g. taxing energy to hold energy-ser-
vice cost roughly constant as efﬁciency rises, or
replacing cheaper-to-run electric vehicles’ lost fuel-tax
revenues with road-use charges to fund upkeep), so
IPCC (2018) p 137 found rebound ‘should not be a
distraction for policy inaction.’ While energy efﬁ-
ciency is generally a macroeconomic stimulant, so too
are many other actions (public health, education,
female empowerment,K) that are not similarly
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criticized. And consumer choice theory implies that
energy rebound enhances economic welfare—particu-
larly for ‘a zero-cost breakthrough rebound’ (Gillingham
Rapson and Wagner 2015) such as, we surmise, inte-
grative design. Thus critics of efﬁciency based on
rebound theories should be calling for greater energy
efﬁciency (GoldsteinMartinez andRoy2011).
Sharply turning down the global
thermostat
Complementing the CO2 abatements discussed so far,
another hopeful mitigation option emerges from the
recent realization, reinforced by IEA (2017a), that a
conceptual confusion—treating short-lived radiative for-
cing agents (CH4, HFCs, O3, and soot [black carbon]) as
equivalent in kind to long-lived ones like CO2—reﬂects a
stock/ﬂow confusion25 that ‘misrepresentsKimpact on
global temperatures’ (Allen et al 2018) and conceals a
huge mitigation opportunity. Consider this analogy: If
you’re atherosclerotic andat long-termriskofheart attack
or stroke, you should apply proven modalities like diet
and exercise to slow or reverse plaque formation. But if
you also happen to be hemorrhaging from a severed
artery, don’t waste time debating the equivalence factor
between rate of blood loss and rate of plaque formation;
stop the bleeding now. That will buy time—indeed,
survival—to work on still-vital but slower remedies for
your evolving chronic condition.
Similarly, debating whether to use 20 years (∼86×)
or 100 years (∼34×) CH4/CO2 global-warming-poten-
tial-per-kg (not per molecule) equivalence factors—or
even shorter, such as 120× over ∼1.5 years (Muller and
Muller 2017)—obscures a key insight. The roughly one-
decade half-life26 of exponentially decaying atmospheric
CH4 concentrates most of its climate threat in the early
years after its emission—three-fourths in the ﬁrst 17 y
(id). This potent, 60%-anthropogenic gas therefore
offers exceptionally rapid climate leverage for good or ill,
far disproportionate to its fractional contribution tomar-
ginal radiative forcing—a fraction often trivialized by
terms like ‘trace gases’ and hence mistreated as a minor
afterthought. Changing how we think and talk about the
dynamics ofmethane in the atmosphere would be akin to
discovering a small but useful emergency handbrake on
our runaway carbon train: its prompt use alone can’t stop
the speeding train, but canmarkedly slow it down27.
The importance of CH4 abatement is concealed by
equivalence factors but highlighted by dynamic simula-
tion. For a given long-term temperature rise, the permis-
sible budget for cumulative CO2 release (a stock) can be
offset by apermanent reduction at the rate atwhichCH4 is
emitted (a ﬂow).MAGICCmodeling by the International
Energy Agency (IEA 2017a) reveals that abating just the
proﬁtable half of the oil and gas industries’ intentional
emissions from ﬂares and engineered vents28 could cut
2100 warming by 0.07 °C, equivalent to avoiding 160 GT
CO2 over the rest of the century. IEA reckons this is
roughly equivalent in 210029 warming effect to instant
decarbonization today of all developed-country existing
homesor all existingChinese coal-ﬁredpower stations, or
of half of all future automobiles worldwide. The expected
ﬁnancial returns, now being ﬁeld-validated, probably
often exceed those of hydrocarbon exploration and pro-
duction, especially on a risk-adjusted basis. Assessments
of this abatement opportunity may also beneﬁt from
some further industry insights on culture, technology,
and business models that are often missing from aca-
demicdiscussions focusedmainly onclimate science.
Mitigating ﬂares and vents typically requires bringing
industry-standard ‘safety process management’ struc-
tures, practices, norms, behaviors, and cultures to
the wellsite—historically exempted and often run by
production ﬁrms unfamiliar with that sophisticated
approach (born of caution because the business produces
hot pressurized explosives). Major ﬁrms’ expanding
agreement to abate their own CH4 emissions is a good
start, but reﬂects a compliance mentality and subdued
ambition. It overlooksmuchof the full business opportu-
nity—conveniently concentrated mostly in a few
25
I.e. ‘for cumulative pollutants likeCO2, radiative forcing largely scales
with the total stock (cumulative integral) of emissions to date, while for
SLCPs [short-lived climate pollutants] like methane, it scales with the
current ﬂow (emissions rate) multiplied by the SLCP lifetime. The
differing climate impacts of CO2 and SLCP emissions become
particularly problematic under ambitious mitigation. Falling SLCP
emissions lead to falling global temperatures, while nominally “equiva-
lent” CO2 emissions…would incorrectly suggest that these falling
emissions would cause further warming’ (Allen et al 2018). Myhre et al
(2013) conﬁrmatp711 that ‘There isno scientiﬁc argument for selecting
100 years [for Global Warming Potential comparisons] compared with
other choices…. The choice of timehorizon is a value judgmentbecause
it dependson the relativeweight assigned to effects at different times’.
26
The perturbation life, reﬂecting complex atmospheric-chemistry
effects, is a few years longer. Methane directly and indirectly caused
about a third of 1750–2011 radiative forcing (Myhre et al 2013
ﬁgure 8.17), but its dynamics make it even more important on the
margin.
27
Seminal papers by Ramanathan and Feng (2008) and
Ramanathan and Xu (2010) suggested early (and sustained) abate-
ment of CH4 andCFCs in concert with aggressive CO2 stabilization.
28
Flares pass through∼2–10%of their CH4 fuel unburned, depending
on design, quality, maintenance, and windspeed. Engineered vents
wouldnormally be illegal for safety reasons, but are allowed if needed for
safety, e.g. to relieve overpressure in a tank, even if that condition was
deliberately designed in: such pressure relief valves can emit a puff of
mixed hydrocarbons, including CH4, tens or hundreds of times a day.
Some systems also use old pneumatic controls that deliberately release
gas. IEA (2017a p 412) found that within the oil and gas industries, ‘The
top 10% of emitting sources…contribute around 70% of total
emissions,’ and ‘…it has been suggested that…reducing emissions from
super-emitters [across all supply-chain subsectors] to “normal” levels
could reduce emissions by around 65–85%’. IEA estimates these
industries’ 2015 CH4 emissions, probably conservatively (Saunois et al
2016), at ∼76 MT—just under 60% intentional (vents), 35% fugitive
(unintended leaks), and the rest from incomplete ﬂare combustion.
Nearly half the emissions are in Eurasia and theMiddle East; two-thirds
come from ten countries; ∼55% are from gas operations. IEA’s 2015
supply curve (2017a p 426) estimates that 75% abatement is technically
feasible and 50% is proﬁtable at 2015 or 40% at 2016 prices (ormore at
late-2018 prices), but the 50% average melds >60% proﬁtable
abatementpotential in theoil industrywith40% in the gas industry.
29
This is the normal benchmark year for Paris Agreement
discussions. A nearer target date, such as 2050, would make CH4
abatementmore important and valuable.
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thousand sites controlled by tens of companies in about
ten nations. Compliancemindset needs to be supplanted
by a gold rush to turn emissions into proﬁts,whether exe-
cutedby current operators orbynewpartners.
Oil and gas companies know how to contain CH4
with virtual perfection, and routinely do sowith sour gas,
whose H2S contaminant is more toxic than HCN, so
leaking sour gas would kill many people. Though some
of the largest ﬁrms are defending US methane standards
from federal attack, most operators focus chieﬂy on pro-
ducing valuable oil, not cheap gas. But three things are
becoming clear: leaking sweet gas is toxic to the oil and
gas business, endangering its license to operate (IEA
2017a); abating just∼10–25MT yr−1 of CH4 could stabi-
lize the entire global CH4 cycle; and abating even more to
reduce atmospheric CH4 concentrations could create
both proﬁts and heroes. Combining these insights, any
supermajor or large oilﬁeld service company could use
its extraordinary technical and organizational skills to try
launching aquick rollupof this global opportunity tooff-
set large marginal CO2 emissions and help buy time to
abate the rest30. Field trials of proﬁtable ﬂare-and-vent
abatement (usually selling microfractionator-separated
C1–C5 alkanes into nearby infrastructure or local LPG
markets), and outreach to leaders of supermajors capable
of saving their ownbusiness and their customers’habitat,
have begun. Let the competition roll.
Similar efforts in natural-systems agriculture, abat-
ing coal-mine vents (especially in China), and rapidly
abating non-CH4 ‘super-emitters’ are still young but
need greater force andurgency. In a strongprecedent,Xu
and Ramanathan (2017) ﬁnd that sustained ‘maximum
deployment of current technologies’ to abate all four
super-emitters is worth ‘about 0.6 °Cby 2050 and 1.2 °C
by 2100.’ Proving the power of this approach, the Mon-
tréal Protocol’s phaseout of O3-depleting halocarbons
and the like has already abated >200 GTCO2e—‘many
more times more than international climate agreements
to date’ (Clare 2018). Astute engagement with hydro-
carbon operators to shift from compliance to entrepre-
neurial mentality and from their own emissions to
everyone’s could build on that success.
Conclusions
This paper points out that recent developments in
energy markets and analyses may open new prospects
for the achievability, social/economic acceptability, and
economic attractiveness of climate targets in the Paris
Agreement, including its aspirational 1.5 °C cap. A
renewed and coordinated effort to represent these
developments in inﬂuential global climate and energy
systems models is critical to saving trillions of dollars
while achieving stringent climatemitigationoutcomes.
The paper ﬁrst describes the unexpectedly dynamic
recent uptake of renewable energy, then summarizes
overlooked recent progress in and future potential for
advanced end-use energy efﬁciency. These two classes of
resources have alreadymarkedly shrunk the gap between
pre-2010 implementation rates and those needed to
achieve targets indicated by the climate modeling litera-
ture. Many models, using ‘historic’ trends, consider
1.5%–2% yr−1 drops in primary energy intensity to be
ambitious; yet the 2010–18 rate averaged 2.03% yr−1,
even reaching 2.7% yr−1 in 2015, and could rise further.
Reduced primary energy intensity plus increased share of
decarbonized ﬁnal supply have lately matched the sus-
tained∼3.4% yr−1 that IPCC AR5 found necessary for a
2 °C trajectory. Together they are only half of, but trend-
ing toward, the sustained∼6.7% yr−1 needed for 1.5 °C.
Fromtheseobservations emerge some respectful sug-
gestions for future modeling efforts: there is a need to
reconsideruseof pre-2011 energydata and tobetter com-
prehend and apply modern energy efﬁciency options
from advanced practitioners and their underapplied
engineering-based literature. IAMs’ efﬁciency deﬁcit
needs a careful look in balance-of-effort,methods, depth,
breadth, and ability to model integrated/systemic mea-
sures and increasing returns (whose absence greatly
understated renewable growth). There is also anopportu-
nity to critically acknowledge, study, test, and if war-
ranted apply high-quality work from other disciplines:
cross-fertilization with different perspectives and schools
of thoughtbeyond technocracy canoften yield step-chan-
ges in enriching analytical insights. Models conﬁrm the
scope for ambitiousmitigation pathways, and provide an
important platform to informemitting industries, policy-
makers, and the public about rapidly exploiting both
modern energy efﬁciency and the short atmospheric life-
times of CH4 and other super-emitters. Enhanced, more
complementaryways of abating these concentrated emis-
sions and exploiting nonlinear beneﬁts (Houser 2018,
Farmer et al 2019, Lovins 2019) can capture newbusiness
and socio-political opportunities by applying basic ﬁrst-
aidprinciples toourplanet’s ailing climate.
In conclusion, when the mainstream climate mod-
els integrate these methodological advances and new
evidence, they are likely to recalibrate the prospects for
achieving ambitious climate targets, including 1.5 °C.
The IPCC’s Special Report on 1.5 °C Global Warming
(2018, p 15) ﬁnds the needed ‘systems transitionsK
unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily in
terms of speed, [needing]Kdeep emissions reductions
in all sectors and a wide portfolio of mitigation
options’—without yet alluding to encouraging recent
precedents in rates of emission reductions and in today’s
large-scale system transitions. Further capturing efﬁ-
ciency resources may help achieve the 1.5 °C target
using less or no bio-energywith carbon capture and sto-
rage (BECCS) in P2–P4 of the illustrative scenarios in
the report (see IPCC2018’s SPM3b)orwith less need for
30
However, multiple studies emphasize that abating CH4 and other
short-lived emitters complements and helps risk-hedge, but cannot
delay or replace, stringent CO2 abatement: Pierrehumbert 2014,
Myhre et al 2011, Rogelj et al 2014. That is, abating CH4 potentiates
simultaneous CO2 reductions but does not permit their
postponement.
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an immediate plunge in demand as in P1. Such changes
may improve the scenarios’ institutional, socio-cultural,
and environmental/ecological feasibility as well as the
balance of their net trade-offs and synergies with SDGs
and other development and environmental agendas—
thus recalibrating climate prospects for all.
Finally, none of the rich menu of climate-change
mitigations—whether driven by business, public policy,
or civil society and individual choice—needwait for these
modeling improvements, but all would beneﬁt from
them, just as IAMs have heightened appreciation of
health co-beneﬁts (West et al 2013, Thompson et al
2014). The technical evidence is now clear that climate
mitigations well in excess of those traditionally modeled
will make sense, make money, create immense co-bene-
ﬁts (chieﬂy for development, equity, health, and security),
and help abate climate change. Reﬁned modeling there-
fore need not precede but should evolve in parallel with
ambitiouspolicy interventions and aggressive adoption.
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